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Printed in the United Kingdom at the University Press, Cambridge The origins of this project stem from a conflict management class that Sara Mitchell taught at Florida State University in the spring 2003 semester. The class discussed a paper by Professor Richard Bilder on international courts, which put forth the interesting argument that countries might be better able to settle interstate disputes peacefully if they could credibly threaten to take each other to the World Court. Sara wrote a paper on this topic for the 2003 Peace Science Society conference that looked at whether states were more likely to reach agreements over geopolitical disputes if they jointly accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, showing that indeed they did. While our fellow Peace Science scholars found these results interesting, they posed a question about selection effects, wondering which countries were more likely to support the World Court in the first place.
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Emilia Powell tackled this research question in a follow-up paper in 2004. She argued that in order to understand the variation in countries' support for international courts, it would be fruitful to examine the similarity between countries' domestic legal traditions and the legal rules employed by the courts. Having trained as a lawyer in a civil law country (Poland), she asserted that civil law countries would be more likely to recognize the jurisdiction of the World Court than common law or Islamic law countries due to the similarities between the civil law domestic legal tradition and the principles employed by the Court. This book is the culmination of these initial ideas, which led to several other jointly authored and solo-authored papers looking at other types of interstate cooperation (e.g. trade, military alliances, and conflict management), other international courts, such as the International Criminal Court, and the rational design of states' commitments to international institutions.
Several of these papers laid the groundwork for the theory and empirical analyses in this book. Some components of Chapters 2 and 5 were initially developed in the following paper:
